within such a confidential file under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 The Court noted that although a defendant is entitled to discover exculpatory information from the government, the defendant may not make the sole determination of what evidence is to be disclosed. 1 ' The Court recognized the compelling state interest in retaining the confidentiality of child abuse investigative files. 12 Rather than breaching this interest in confidentiality, the majority remanded the case and instructed the trial court to review the confidential file in camera and to release any material evidence to the defendant. 13 This Note examines the Ritchie opinions and concludes that the plurality's refusal to grant disclosure under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment represents an unjustified restriction of that constitutional guarantee. This Note argues that the confrontation clause should encompass pre-trial events that have an adverse effect on a defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses at trial. Furthermore, this Note contends that the confrontation clause contemplates inquiries into the potential effectiveness of the opportunity for cross-examination to assure the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to impeach a witness' testimony. 1 4 Finally, this Note suggests that the Court properly remanded the case for an in camera review but should have limited the scope of the procedure to a search for any inconsistent prior statements of the witness.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June of 1979, George Ritchie was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. 15 Ritchie's alleged victim was his thirteen-year-old daughter, who claimed that the sexual attacks had occurred at a rate of two to three times a week over a four-year period. 16 The charges against Ritchie stemmed from an attack on June 11, 1979, when the daughter was taken to the police by an aunt. 17 The daughter's case was subsequently turned over to Children and Youth Services (CYS). 18 In the course of preparing his defense, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena requesting access to the agency's file on his daughter's case.' 9 CYS denied Ritchie and his attorney access to the file on the basis of the file's confidentiality. 20 Records compiled by CYS in the investigation of child abuse cases are privileged under Pennsylvania law, subject to several statutory exceptions. 2 ' One such confidentiality exception permits CYS to disclose reports to "[a] court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order."
'2 2
At a pre-trial hearing held in chambers, Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for the agency's failure to provide access to the subpoenaed records. 23 Ritchie argued that the records were necessary to his defense because they might contain the names of witnesses, medical records, and other unspecified evidence that would enable him to impeach or discredit the complainant. 24 The trial judge, however, relied upon CYS' representation that there were no medi- 18 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. Children Youth Services (hereinafter CYS) is a protective service agency established by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to investigate cases of suspected child abuse and neglect. Id. The Agency was formerly designated as Child Welfare Services (CWS). Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. at 360 n.4, 502 A.2d at 149 n.4.
19 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. Ritchie requested any contents of the file concerning the charges against him and records allegedly made in 1978 after CYS conducted an investigation of potential child abuse against his daughter. Id. Although the earlier investigation occurred during the time period in which the attacks allegedly took place, no criminal charges stemming from the earlier investigation were filed against Ritchie. Id. at n.1. 20 Id. at 994. 21 Id. 22 At the time of trial, the Pennsylvania statute provided: (a) [R] eports made pursuant to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . .and written reports . . . as well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or x-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession of the department, a county public child welfare agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
(1) A duly authorized official of a child protective service in the course of his official duties.
(2) A physician examining or treating a child or the director or a person specifically designated in writing by such director of any hospital or other medical institution where a child is being treated .... cal records contained in the record. 25 The trial judge denied the motion to sanction CYS and declined to order the Agency to provide access to its file.
6
At trial, the commonwealth's main witness was Ritchie's daughter. 27 Defense counsel was given the opportunity to impeach her testimony during cross-examination. 28 The trial court placed few limitations on the scope of cross-examination, allowing defense counsel to question the daughter on all aspects of the alleged attacks and her motivation for not reporting the abuse earlier. 2 9 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Ritchie guilty on all counts and the court sentenced him to three to ten years imprisonment.3 0 Ritchie appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, contending that CYS' failure to disclose the contents of the file violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 3 ' The superior court agreed that his right of confrontation had been violated 3 2 and, accordingly, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 3 3 The court held, however, that the commonwealth's interest in confidentiality outweighed Ritchie's right to obtain specific material not relevant to the charges against him. 3 4 The superior court instructed the trial court on remand to review the record in camera 3 5 to determine if 25 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995. The trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the entire CYS file. In fact, he indicated that he had not read 50 pages or more of the CYS record. Id. at n.3. 26 Id. at 995. The trial court issued an order stating that "the [c]ourt finds that no medical records are being held by the Child Welfare Services that would be to the benefit of the defendant in this case." Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. at 360, 502 A.2d at 149. 27 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995. 28 Id. 29 Id. The only limitations imposed by the trial judge were routine evidentiary rulings. Id In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
The sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965 In camera is defined as "in chambers." In an in camera inspection, a trial judge they contained any statements made by the daughter regarding the abuse and to disclose any such statements. 8 6 If no such statements were contained in the files, the trial court was instructed to reinstate the original sentence. 3 7 Additionally, the superior court indicated that although the CYS record was confidential, counsel should be allowed access to the file in order to argue the relevance of any statements released by the reviewing judge. 3 8 If the trial court held that the statements were relevant or that the error in denying access was not harmless, the superior court contended that the defendant should be granted a new trial. On appeal by the commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed that the denial of access to the CYS file violated Ritchie's sixth amendment rights. 40 The court concluded that the commonwealth's interest in the confidentiality of the records did not outweigh the defendant's right to effectively confront and crossexamine witnesses. 4 1 The in camera review favored by the superior court was rejected as insufficient because such a review "den[ies] the opportunity to have the files reviewed with the eyes and perspective of an advocate." '4 2 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial will "inspect a document which counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its admissibility or its use." BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
36 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. at 567-68,472 A.2d at 226. These statements were to be made available to Ritchie's counsel who would then have the opportunity to argue that the statements could have been used to impeach the witness' testimony. The commonwealth would then be permitted to argue that the failure to provide counsel with these statements at trial was harmless error. Id. 37 Id.
38
Id. This right of inspection was limited, however. The court stated that counsel's access was strictly for the purpose of arguing relevance and that counsel was "otherwise bound by the confidential nature of the material in the record." Id. 39 Id. 40 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 502 A.2d 148 (1985) . 41 Id. at 367, 502 A.2d at 153. The court also stated that "[w]hen materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." Id. The court analyzed Ritchie's sixth amendment rights generally without separately analyzing the confrontation and compulsory process clause components. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not fully develop a compulsory process clause analysis. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell chose to apply the docirine of compulsory process under a fourteenth amendment due process analysis rather than under the sixth amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 87-97 for a discussion ofJustice Powell's treatment of the compulsory process clause. 42 Id. at 367, 502 A.2d at 153. The court was not entirely unsympathetic to the privacy concerns of CYS. It cautioned that the trial court should take "appropriate steps to insure against the improper dissemination of sensitive material gleaned from the files." Id. at 368 n.16, 502 A.2d at 153 n.16 (citing In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 28-29, 428 A.2d 126, 132-33 (1981)). Suggested steps in protecting file confidentiality included "fashioning of appropriate protective orders, or conducting the pro-court so that Ritchie's counsel could be granted access to the file. 43 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 44 to determine if a state's interest in the confidentiality of its child abuse investigation files outweighed a criminal defendant's right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to discover favorable evidence contained in those files. The primary object of the [confrontation clause] ... was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. The Court has emphasized that the primary interest secured by this right of face-to-face confrontation is an "adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
' 48 Generally, cases arising under the confrontation clause have fallen into two broad categories: "cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination. 52 in which an out-of-court statement by an unavailable witness satisfied the demands of the confrontation clause because defense counsel fully cross-examined the witness at the time the statement was made.
53
In the second category of cases, the defendant's right to confront his accusers is violated by restrictions placed on the scope of cross-examination either by operation of law or by a trial court's rulings. The Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska 54 is an excellent illustration of this second category. In Davis, a court order issued pursuant to a state statute prohibiting the admission of juvenile police records precluded the defendant from demonstrating the witness' bias during cross-examination. 55 The Court held that the inability to question the witness regarding his source of bias comrejected the confrontation clause claim because "[t]his case falls in neither category."
Id. at 19. The Fensterer defendant alleged that his rights under the confrontation clause were violated when his attempt to cross-examine an expert witness was impeded by the expert's failure to recall the underlying tests on which he had based his conclusion. Id. at 17-18. The Court held that in such cases the defendant's rights are unaffected because "the factfinder can observe the witness' demeanor under cross-examination, and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the accused." Id. at 20. The Court determined that the defendant adequately demonstrated the witness' loss of memory to the jury and impeached the witness' conclusion through the testimony of his own expert witnesses. (1970) , that the defendant's confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of prior inconsistent statements made by the witness "as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination." Id. at 158. In fact, the Court in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1985) , held that the admission of testimony of a deceased witness from a previous trial did not violate the confrontation clause if "[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination." Id. been a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to permit an appeal until all litigation has been concluded in the court of first instance."); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945)("Finality must be in two senses: it must be subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribunal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein."). Ritchie contended that the judgment in this case was not final because additional proceedings were to be conducted in the Pennsylvania courts. Ritchie noted that at a minimum the trial court must conduct an in camera review of the file and hear arguments by the parties as to whether the failure to disclose the contents of the files constituted prejudicial error. If the trial court found the error to be prejudicial, Ritchie would be granted a new trial. Ritchie further explained that because the sixth amendment issue might yet become moot, the Court should not review the claim until all proceedings in the Pennsylvania courts were completed. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 996. unable to raise the issue on appeal. Id. In scenario one, if on remand the trial court found that the nondisclosure was harmless or that the file did not contain relevant information, the judgment would be reinstated and the commonwealth would have no basis on which to seek an appeal. Justice Powell maintained that even if Ritchie appealed his conviction under this scenario, the constitutional claim would be preserved only if the commonwealth filed a cross-petition. Id. at 997. He noted that in the past the Court has considered cases in this procedural posture to be sufficiently final. Under scenario two, if the trial court found the nondisclosure to be prejudicial and if upon retrial the commonwealth prevailed on the merits, the same conditions as scenario one would result. Similarly, if Ritchie prevailed, the commonwealth would be precluded from appeal by the double jeopardy clause. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997. See California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 498 n.71 (1966)(decided with Miranda v. Arizona).
Justice Powell recognized a third scenario, suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Ritchie. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7. See infra note 154 for an analysis ofJustice Stevens' position. In this scenario, if the trial court found prejudicial error, the commonwealth could take an immediate appeal of the order. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., PA. R.A.P., Rule 311 (a)(5)(Purdon Supp. 1987). Justice Powell noted the dissent's argument that the claim is not final because the commonwealth could raise the sixth amendment issue once again on appeal. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7. However, Justice Powell was unpersuaded that the constitutional issues would necessarily survive for the Court's review. Id. For instance, the superior court could reverse and find the nondisclosure harmless, thus preventing further review. In the alternative, if the superior court agreed that the error was prejudicial, the court would allow the commonwealth to again raise the sixth amendment issue. Justice Powell argued that in order to reach the Supreme Court, the commonwealth would have to raise an appeal at each level of the Pennsylvania court system. Such an approach, in his estimation, would be wastful because the issue had been definitively decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. He concluded that in this situation "the justifications for the finality doctrine--efficiency, judicial restraint, and federalism-would be ill served by another round of litigation on an issue that has been authoratatively decided by the highest state court." Id. (citation omitted). 73 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7. 74 Id. at 997. Justice Powell observed that although this concern is not dispositive of the jurisdiction issue, the Court has concluded that" 'statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.'" Id. at 997-98 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.l1 (1976)). 75 Id. at 998. Justice Powell distinguished Ritchie from the Court's decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971). Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998 n.8. He noted that the Ryan Court refused to review a district court's denial of the respondent's motion to quash a subpoena of business records. Id. Justice Powell explained that the Ryan Court had rejected the respondent's assertion that an immediate review was necessary to avoid disclosing protected materials because the respondent had the option of finalizing the issue by ignoring the subpoena. Id.
The Ritchie majority observed that the Ryan Court's concern with the" 'necessity for B. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE Justice Powell, representing a plurality of the Court, rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the confrontation clause. 7 6 He initially observed that the confrontation clause provides two types of protections for defendants: the right to confront witnesses and the right to conduct cross-examination. 77 Justice Powell distinguished Ritchie's claim from these two basic protections because Ritchie did not allege that he was denied the opportunity to confront or cross-examine his daughter. 78 The plurality stressed that the confrontation clause does not apply to allegations that the defendant was denied the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witness. 79 The plurality observed that in accepting Ritchie's argument, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied in part on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska. 8 0 In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge's restriction of the questioning of a witness regarding his juvenile criminal record represented a violation of the confrontation clause. 8 ' Justice Powell refused to exexpedition in the administration of the criminal law' . . . would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable." Id. (quoting Ryan, 402 U.S. at 533). The Court's implicit assumption in Ryan, Justice Powell contended, was that unless the party opposing discovery was willing to be held in contempt, the issue was not important enough to justify interrupting the proceeding for an appeal. Ritchie was different, Justice Powell explained, because the trial had concluded, and, therefore, the interest in expediting criminal proceedings would not be undermined. The majority maintained that judicial economy would be enhanced by hearing the present appeal rather than by requiring Ritchie to raise fruitless appeals in the Pennsylvania courts. Id.
76 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun did not join in this portion of the opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion. See infra text accompanying notes 107-124. 77 Id. at 998 (plurality opinion)(citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per curiam)). 78 Id. at 998 (plurality opinion). 79 Id. at 998-99 (plurality opinion). Ritchie argued that he did have the opportunity to cross-examine his daughter but that his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was nonetheless undermined. He contended that without access to the CYS file he could not effectively question her during cross-examination. Id. at 998 (plurality opinion). Ritchie asserted that access to the file would have enabled him to establish weaknesses in her testimony and to discredit her. Id. at 998-99 (plurality opinion). See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1974)(reference to restricted juvenile police records during cross-examination is necessary to impeach witness' reliability). Because impeachment of key witnesses will often determine the outcome of a case, Ritchie concluded that by denying him the opportunity to effectively cross-examine and impeach the witness, his sixth amendment rights had been violated. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion). See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence ....").
80 415 U.S. 308 (1974) . 81 Id. at 318-20. The Court found this restriction to be a sixth amendment violation tend Davis to compel discovery of privileged information whenever a defendant asserts a need before trial to review such information for the purpose of impeaching a witness' testimony at trial. 8 2 Such an extension, inJustice Powell's estimation, would effectively transform the confrontation clause into a rule of pre-trial discovery despite the Court's earlier rulings to the contrary. 8 3 He stated, instead, that" 'the Confrontation Clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' "84 The plurality contended that the constitutional violation in Davis stemmed not from the confidentiality of the records but rather from the restriction of defense counsel's ability " 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' "85 In Ritchie, Justice Powell concluded, the right to confrontation would have been violated if the trial judge had restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of the daughter, but it was not violated because CYS refused to disclose its file. 56, 73 n.12 (1980)(should not inquire into effectiveness of cross-examination except in the most extraordinary of circumstances). In Fensterer, the Court found that the accused's right to confrontation was not implicated because the "trial court did not limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19. For a discussion of Fensterer, see supra note 49. Justice Powell further contended that Fensterer was in complete accord with the Court's earlier decisions in which it found a confrontation clause violation only if there was a statutory or court-imposed infringement on the scope of questioning. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000 (plurality opinion). See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986)(restriction of questioning about a potential source for witness' bias violates confrontation clause); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)(restriction on reference to juvenile police record of witness interferes with defendant's ability to effectively cross-examine); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)(inability to impeach own witness who recanted earlier admissions deprives defendant of a fair trial); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968)(restriction of questions regarding a witness' true identity violates the defendant's sixth amendment rights); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 4,15 (1965)(inability to cross-examine co-defendant violates confrontation clause). 85 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000 (plurality opinion)(quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 86 Id. (plurality opinion).
C. THE COMPULSORY PROCESS AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the Court, confirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling that nondisclosure of CYS files violated the sixth amendment's guarantee of compulsory process.
8 7 After reviewing the sparse history of the compulsory process clause, the majority concluded that "[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt." 8 8 Justice Powell observed, however, that the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the clause "guarantees the right to discover the identity of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence." 8 9 He noted that the Court has traditionally reviewed such claims under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
9 0 As such, Justice Powell refrained from examining Ritchie's claim under the less certain compulsory process clause framework, but instead evaluated the claim under a more traditional due process analysis.
9 '
Justice Powell indicated that it is well settled that the due process clause obligates the government to turn over evidence that is either favorable to the defendant or material to a determination of his or her guilt.
9 2 The majority noted that the Court has determined that evidence is material if" 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 87 Id. Ritchie argued that the failure to disclose the files prohibited him from discovering the names of potentially favorable witnesses and other evidence contained in the file. Justice Powell noted that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on compulsory process was unclear, the Pennsylvania court implicitly concluded that the compulsory process right requires the state's assistance in discovering useful evidence despite the statutorily created prohibition. 
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the proceeding would have been different.' "9 Justice Powell, however, recognized that the Court could not presently determine whether the CYS file contained material evidence because the parties had been denied access to the file and the trial judge had only partially reviewed its contents. 9 4 He rejected the Commonwealth's contention that the statutory privilege placed an absolute prohibition on any search for material evidence because the legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings. 9 5 The majority, therefore, affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to remand the case. 9 6 The due process clause, according to the Court, entitled Ritchie to further review by a trial court to determine if there existed evidence material to his conviction. The Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie agreed that the defendant was entitled to material evidence contained in the CYS file. 98 Justice Powell, however, indicated that this right did "not include the un-93 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun,J.,joined by one otherjustice)). A reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by one other justice).
94 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002. The commonwealth argued that the Court should not inquire into materiality because the legislature had deemed the file confidential. To allow disclosure, the commonwealth asserted, would destroy the state's interest in file confidentiality on mere speculation that the file might contain useful evidence. Id. The commonwealth pointed out that Ritchie must specifically show what evidence he wishes disclosed and its materiality. Id. at n.15. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-110 ("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.").
Justice Powell recognized the strong state interest in confidentiality and acknowledged that Ritchie could not require the trial court to search the CYS file without establishing that the file contained material information. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002 n.15. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)("He must at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense."). Justice Powell contended that although the commonwealth's obligation to disclose exculpatory information contained in the file existed in the absence of a specific request, "the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request may have a bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002 n.15. supervised authority to search through the Commonwealth's files." 9 9 Although the Court has recognized that "the eye of an advocate may be helpful" to discovery, 1 0 0 the majority claimed the Court "has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant alone may make the determination as to the materiality of information." 10 1 Justice Powell concluded that the defendant had no constitutional right to search the commonwealth's files to determine the relevance of the evidence.
2
The majority determined that Ritchie's interest in receiving a fair trial could be adequately protected by submitting the records to the trial court for an in camera review. 1 0 3 Justice Powell explained that although Ritchie would lose the benefit of an "advocate's eye" in an in camera review, "the trial court's discretion is not unbounded."' 1 4 He contended that allowing defense counsel unlimited access to the CYS file would unnecessarily destroy the commonwealth's compelling interest in the confidentiality of its child abuse files.' 0 5 Justice Powell concluded that the risk of the trial court's failing to recognize some exculpatory evidence did not warrant interference with the commonwealth's efforts to uncover and prevent child abuse. 104 Id. Justice Powell noted that if a defendant had knowledge of specific information contained in the file, such as a medical report, he could request its disclosure and argue its materiality. Additionally, he indicated that an in camera review should be ongoing, so that a court could reevaluate the file as the trial developed and release any evidence as it became material. Id. 105 Id. The majority stressed that file confidentiality would encourage abused children and other witnesses to come forward and report the crime. The Court noted the possible adverse effects disclosure would have on Pennsylvania's efforts to combat such abuse. Id.
106 Id. at 1004.
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Justice Blackmun concurred in its judgment but rejected the plurality's conclusion that the confrontation clause applies only to events occurring at trial. 10 7 Justice Blackmun contended that the mere opportunity to cross-examine a witness would be insufficient if the defendant were denied the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witness.' 0 8 He explained that "[i]f I were to accept the plurality's effort to divorce confrontation analysis from any examination into the effectiveness of cross-examination, I believe that in some situations the confrontation right would become an empty formality."109 Justice Blackmun distinguished those cases in which the simple questioning of a witness would satisfy the purposes of cross-examination from those situations in which questioning alone would be insufficient and potentially detrimental. 110 Justice Blackmun indicated that the Supreme Court rejected the confrontation clause claim in Delaware v. Fensterer because that case illustrated an instance in which simple questioning proved adequate."' He explained that in Fensterer the defendant asserted that his right to confront was violated when the prosecution's expert witness could not recall the method he had used to arrive at his conclusion. 112 The facts of Fensterer, Justice Blackmun contended, demonstrated an instance in which defense counsel could effectively undermine the witness' credibility through basic questioning and through the testimony of other defense experts. 1 13 Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality's 108 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 109 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Blackmun contended that even the plurality would agree that an important aspect of cross-examination is to cast doubt on a witness' testimony. In his estimation, the mere opportunity to question "makes little sense set apart from the goals of cross-examination." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) . 118 Id. at 1004-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the Fensterer Court did not imply that the confrontation clause was unconcerned with the effectiveness of cross-examination but rather that "when... simple questioning serves the purpose of cross-examination, a defendant cannot claim a confrontation violation application of Fensterer for the proposition that the confrontation clause merely referred to the opportunity for cross-examination rather than the opportunity for effective cross-examination.'
14 Justice Blackmun recognized that the Fensterer Court stated that " 'the confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'"115 Justice Blackmun contended that Davis v. Alaska 11 6 represented an instance in which simple questioning was insufficient." 17 Although the defendant in Davis had access to the witness' juvenile police record, he could not refer to it while attempting to demonstrate the witness' potential bias during cross-examination.' 1 8 The Davis Court held that questioning, without reference to the witness' juvenile record, would be useless and potentially harmful to the defendant's case because the jury might view the questioning as a baseless attack on the credibility of an innocent witness. 1 19 Justice Blackmun found that Davis and Ritchie were compellingly similar as both defendants were limited to simple questioning and prohibited from referring to specific facts which might have established witness bias.' 20 Justice Blackmun concluded that a state violates a defendant's right to witness confrontation when the state's effort to protect confidentiality hinders the defendant's ability to effectively crossexamine. 121 Despite his disagreement with the plurality's narrow reading of the confrontation clause, Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment because the Court's solution to the confrontation dilemma was satisfactory.
12 2 Justice Blackmun maintained that in camera review would adequately identify and disclose any material statements made by Ritchie's daughter that could be used to impeach her credibecause there might have been a more effective means of cross-examination." Id. at 1005 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 114 Id. at 1005 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan dissented from the plurality's conclusion that the confrontation clause applies only to events occurring at trial. 12 5 Justice Brennan's criticism of the plurality was based on his belief that events outside of trial could equally infringe upon the right of cross-examination.' 26 The trial court's denial of access to prior statements made by the daughter, according to the dissent, deprived Ritchie of information crucial to witness impeachment and therefore violated his rights under the confrontation clause.
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Justice Brennan initially identified the Court's historic understanding that the confrontation clause guarantees the right to crossexamination.' 28 Although restricting a line of inquiry at trial may be one way of impairing the right to cross-examine, Justice Brennan suggested that the confrontation clause does not exclusively address such restrictions.
1 29 The dissent emphasized that a denial of access to important information would hamper defense counsel's ability to pursue lines of interrogation at trial.' 30 Foreclosing lines of inquiry through nondisclosure, Justice Brennan explained, interferes with counsel's ability to cross-examine as much as restrictions imposed by the trial court.' 3 ' He argued that, in fact, the Court had already held that the right of cross-examination may be infringed by events occurring outside the scope of trial. 132 InJencks v. United States, 133 the Court ruled that the defendant should be given access to previous statements made by prosecution witnesses to government agents. 3 4 Justice Brennan observed that in accordance withJencks, defendants are entitled to inspect materials that relate to the witness' testimony.1 3 5 He criticized the plurality's insistence that counsel be restricted at trial from pursuing a specific line of inquiry to establish a confrontation violation, because without prior access to the file, counsel could not identify the subjects of inquiry foreclosed from examination at trial.' 3 6 The Court's holding, Justice Brennan concluded, would recognize confrontation clause violations only in situations in which there was a partial denial of access but not when defense counsel was absolutely denied access.' 3 7
The dissent argued that Davis v. Alaska,' 3 8 although focusing primarily on the restriction at trial, did not indicate "that an infringement on the right to cross-examination could occur only in that context."' 1 9 Justice Brennan examined Davis and noted that although the immediate barrier to cross-examination was the trial judge's restriction of defense counsel inquiries into the juvenile police record, the underlying impediment was the statutory prohibition on disclosure of such records. 40 134 Id. at 668-69. The Court contended that such access was critical because the defendant's ability to impeach witnesses against him was "singularly important," and the reports were crucial to the impeachment effort. Id. at 667. 135 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan indicated that althoughJencks was decided on non-constitutional grounds," 'it would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision.'" Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959)(Brennan, J., concurring)). 136 Id. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan additionally argued that the Court's decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), demonstrates that pre-trial events may disturb the right of cross-examination. Id. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Wade, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to the presence of counsel at a pre-trial lineup "to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial as affected by his right to meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses against him." Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. If counsel were not present to observe any unfairness at the lineup, Justice Brennan explained, the defendant may lose his only significant opportunity to attack the credibility of the witness' identification. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 232). Because counsel would be precluded from developing a line of inquiry at trial based upon the denial of pre-trial access, Justice Brennan concluded that Wade dictates a different conclusion than the plurality advocated. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 137 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the due process clause, rather than the confrontation clause, would not provide a better mechanism for providing the defendant access to material information because "due process analysis requires that information be evaluated by the trial judge, not defense counsel."' 14 3 A neutral trial judge, Justice Brennan argued, may be unable to recognize the materiality of prior statements if the trial judge does not recognize their subtle potential for impeaching a witness. 14 4 Justice Brennan pointed out that theJencks Court held that defense counsel should examine the statements " '[b]ecause only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for the purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby firthering the accused's defense.'"145 In conclusion, Justice Brennan maintained that "while Confrontation Clause and due process analysis may in some cases be congruent, the Confrontation Clause has independent significance in protecting against infringements on the right to crossexamination. Justice Stevens, after examining the various procedural scenarios that might occur if the Court declined further review, determined that Ritchie did not properly fit within the Cox Broadcasting exception. 154 The dissent maintained that the commonwealth could 153 Id. at 481. Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he concern, of course, is that the petitioning party not be put in a position where he might eventually lose on the merits, but would have never had an opportunity to present his federal claims for review." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 481). The most frequent example of this scenario arises, Justice Stevens explained, when a state appeals an appellate court's order to suppress evidence. In such a case, if the state was forced to proceed to trial before subsequent review, it might lose on the merits and be barred from further appeals by the double jeopardy clause. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) . See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 n.1 (1984)(procdeural posture in which federal issue cannot be reviewed regardless of outcome in state court falls under Cox Broadcasting exception). 154 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that in the first scenario, CYS "might refuse to produce the documents under penalty of contempt, in which case appeals could be taken, and this Court could obtain proper jurisdiction." Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the second scenario, if CYS disclosed the records, the trial court might find the error to be harmless and uphold Ritchie's conviction. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) . In that event, Justice Stevens commented, "the Commonwealth would not have been harmed by our having declined to review the case at this stage." Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) . Finally, in the last scenario, if the trial court determined that the nondisclosure was prejudicial and ordered a new trial, under Pennsylvania law the commonwealth could obtain an immediate interlocu-[Vol. 78
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not lose the case on federal constitutional grounds without an opportunity to appeal the issue to the Supreme Court. 15 5 Furthermore, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's preference for Supreme Court review before disclosure of the file rendered its confidentiality moot because this preference contradicted the Court's long-standing tradition of avoiding constitutional issues if the case can be disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds. 56 The Court's policy against hearing unnecessary constitutional claims, he concluded, "demands strict application of the finality requirement."' 57 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's contention that immediate Supreme Court review was needed to prevent the sacrifice of the commonwealth's interest in confidentiality. 158 Instead, he cited the Court's well-established rule of granting the party objecting to disclosure the option to refuse production of the requested documents if that party believes the disclosure will be harmful and to appeal immediately any resulting contempt orders. 159 Justice Stevens concluded that the requisite conditions for hppellate review did not exist because CYS had not yet been given the opportunity to choose between complying with the court order or being held in contempt of court. 157 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1011 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1948)). 158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 159 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that this rule was used in United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971), a case in which the district court denied a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents located in Kenya. The Court ultimately ruled that the order was non-appealable and argued that if the subpoena was as unduly burdensome as claimed, the party may refuse to comply and risk being held in contempt of court. Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-33. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940)("Whatever right [the witness] may have requires no further protection.., than that afforded by the district court until the witness chooses to disobey and is committed for contempt."). 160 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1012 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasized Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's assertion that because the case had been tried and appealed, an immediate review would expedite the conclusion of the case. 16 1 Justice Stevens contended that had the Court not granted certiorari, the trial court might have already disposed of the case. 162 Because litigants would interrupt lower court proceedings with time-consuming interlocutory appeals, Justice Stevens concluded that a case-by-case assessment of finality would ultimately lead to greater inefficiencies. 1 6 3 VIII. ANALYSIS
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In Ritchie, the plurality misinterpreted the scope of the confrontation clause in holding that the defendant's rights were not violated by CYS' refusal to comply with the subpoena. Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, maintained that the confrontation clause should be narrowly construed.'6 He contended that the clause merely affords the defendant a "trial" right to cross-examination.
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Moreover, Justice Powell found that this right encompasses only the opportunity for cross-examination rather than the effectiveness of the opportunity.' 66 Justice Powell's analysis, unfortunately, reflects a rather short-sighted view of the confrontation clause. To ignore the effects of pre-trial events on the scope of cross-examination or to limit the defendant's right strictly to an opportunity to confront witnesses against him, would indeed render the confrontation clause an "empty formality."
In Davis, the trial court, pursuant to a state statute, issued a pre-trial protective order prohibiting any reference to a key witness' juvenile police record. 170 The Davis Court concluded that this prohibition prevented defense counsel from adequately demonstrating to the jury the witness' source of bias. 17 1 The Court stated:
On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination. .... 172
Justice Powell rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's view that under Davis a statutory privilege was less important than the defendant's need for pre-trial access to information which might be used to impeach the witness. 17 The effect of such a broad interpretation, he maintained, "would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery."' 174 Justice Powell, therefore, concluded that Ritchie's sixth amendment rights would have been violated by a court-imposed restriction of cross-examination at trial rather than by the denial of access to CYS files before trial. However, Justice Powell mistakenly believed that the restriction of cross-examination in Davis occurred exclusively at trial. Although the effect of the restriction rendered defense counsel unable to question the witness directly on his source of bias, the restriction emanated from the pre-trial order. 176 This pre-trial order prevented defense counsel from providing the jurors with evidence that 169 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). 170 Davis, 415 U.S. at 311. Despite the court-imposed restriction, defense counsel attempted to expose the witness' potential bias without specific reference to the police record. Id. at 312. 171 Id. at 318. 172 Id. Justice Powell contended that the error in Davis was not that the records were confidential but that the defendant was denied the opportunity to expose to the jury circumstances from which they might infer that the witness was unreliable. Id. at 1000 (plurality opinion)(citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 173 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the confidentiality of the files was less important than "a defendant's right to effectively confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him." Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985) . Furthermore, the court declared "that it would be absurd to read the statute as providing that the records be made available to a court of competent jurisdiction, while denying any use of them to the litigants in a criminal case before such courts." Id., 502 A.2d at 153. 174 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion). 175 Id. at 1000 (plurality opinion). 176 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 311. The prosecution ultimately objected to defense counsel's line of inquiry not on the grounds that the defense violated the pre-trial order, but might have allowed them to infer the witness' bias just as effectively as if the trial court had restricted defense counsel's inquiries at the time of cross-examination. 177 Davis demonstrates that the distinction between pre-trial and trial events is meaningless because pretrial events can be as restrictive on the ability to cross-examine as is a restriction imposed at trial.' 78 As Justice Brennan argued, " [w] hile Davis focused most explicitly on the restriction at trial of cross-examination, nothing in the opinion indicated that an infringement on the right to cross-examination could occur only in that context."' 179 In short, the pre-trial/trial distinction announced by Justice Powell does not logically follow from the Court's decision in Davis.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, contended that the similarities between Davis and Ritchie outweigh any differences. 180 In both cases defense counsel was prevented from referring to specific facts that might have suggested the bias of a critical witness. 18 1 Whether the restriction occurred at or before trial, the defense was effectively prohibited from pursuing lines of inquiry during crossexamination. Therefore, the Ritchie plurality should have recognized a sixth amendment violation on the same grounds as the violation was found in Davis. Justice Blackmun acknowledged, however, that the cases were technically different because the defense in Davis had access to the prohibited records. 18 2 He noted that Davis was restricted at trial from pursuing an available line of inquiry while Ritchie's pre-trial preparation was hindered by the nondisclosure of potentially useful information.
1 8 3 Rejecting this distinction, Justice rather because defense counsel's repeated questions merely rehashed prior cross-examination. Id. at 312-13. The trial court sustained the prosecution's objections. Id. at 313. 177 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973)("This extension of the right to counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to generate pre-trial events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial itself."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(presence of counsel at pre-trial identification lineup necessary "to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him").
179 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that this distinction "ignores the fact that the right of crossexamination also may be significantly infringed by events occurring outside of trial itself." Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). After concluding that the right to confront was basically a trial right, Justice Powell indicated that the scope of this right is satisfied whenever "defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses." 19 5 In his view, accordingly, the confrontation clause should provide the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination rather than serve as a basis for scrutinizing the effectiveness of cross-examination. 9 6 In support of this proposition, Justice Powell cited the Court's decision in Delaware v. Fensterer,' 9 7 in which the Court declared that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. "' 198 In his concurrence, however, Justice Blackmun argued that such a conclusion is questionable. He stated that by "divorc[ing] confrontation analysis from any examination into the effectiveness of cross-examination . . . in some situations the confrontation right would become an empty formality."' 1 9 Justice Blackmun recognized that the plurality's reliance on the above-quoted remark from liminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable." Id. at 725-26. The Court has recognized instances in which pre-trial cross-examination satisfies the confrontation clause. See supra note 189.
Fensterer was misguided. 20 0 The remark can be read to imply that the confrontation clause provides an opportunity for effective cross-examination rather than, as Justice Powell asserted, the mere opportunity to confront a witness without regard for the potential effectiveness of that confrontation. 20 1 Justice Blackmun chose the former interpretation and explained that "it means... when, as in Fensterer, simple questioning serves the purpose of cross-examination, a defendant cannot claim a confrontation violation because there might have been a more effective means of cross-examination." 20 2 The necessity for inquiries into the potential effectiveness of confrontation opportunities is demonstrated by cases such as Davis, in which the physical opportunity to question a witness existed but was insufficient. Although the Court has never expressly held that there must be an opportunity for effective cross-examination, this position has been strongly implied. 2 0 4 The Court in Davis, for instance, after analyzing the defendant's limited ability to cross-examine the juvenile witness, concluded that the "[p]etitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination." 20 5 Justice Blackmun explained that in Davis simple questioning without reference to the privileged material would be tantamount to no cross-examination at all.
2 0 6 Similarly, in Smith v. Illinois,207 the Court held that the defendant had a right under the confrontation clause to ask a witness for his true identity for the purpose of impeaching the latter's testimony. 20 8 The Smith Court argued that " [t] o forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of crossexamination itself." 20 9 Finally, the Court in Fensterer stated that "the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony." 2 10 As the facts of Davis, Smith and Ritchie demonstrate, the mere opportunity to cross-examine a witness does not necessarily provide the jury with the requisite information with which to question a witness' credibility. Dismissal of any considerations of the potential effectiveness of cross-examination would surely render the right of confrontation a hollow promise. IN CAMERA REVIEW
The majority in Ritchie accurately concluded that the defendant was entitled to have the CYS files reviewed for "material" evidence. 2 12 Justice Powell, after weighing the competing interests, ju-diciously determined that only an in camera review by the trial court would protect Ritchie's right to a fair trial while preserving the state's interest in the confidentiality of its child abuse files. The Court's decision, however, provides a trial court with great discretion in conducting its in camera review, as the search will be performed exclusively by the trial court without the benefit of an advocate's perspective. 21 3 Although future defendants are denied the advantages of their attorney's expertise in ferreting out information, Ritchie will provide defendants with a needed mechanism for compelling a court review of privileged or confidential information for useful evidence. The in camera compromise is well supported by the decisions of numerous courts. 2 15 In United States v. Nixon, 2 16 the Court concluded that the President's generalized interest in the confidentiality of his records could not supersede "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." 2 17
The district court was entrusted to review the material in camera to determine if there existed evidence that met "the test of admissibility and relevance. '2 18 Although Nixon did not provide the framework for Justice Powell's analysis in Ritchie, the Court in both cases the subject matter.., is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge."); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)("[Sjuppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment .... "). 213 chose to permit the disclosure of some information without compromising the confidentiality of the entire body of information. 2 19 Additionally, the Court in both Nixon and Ritchie concluded that the trial court could adequately determine the materiality of information in voluminous files without the assistance of an "eye of an advocate."220
The strongest argument favoring full disclosure of CYS records to the defendant was the denial of the opportunity "to have the files reviewed with the eyes and the perspective of an advocate." 22 (1957) (prejudicial error to permit the government to withhold the identity of its informant if the informant's possible testimony would be relevant and useful to the defense) with McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)(no need to reveal an informant's name at a pre-trial hearing if the lack of disclosure did not deny the defendant his sixth amendment rights).
Rovario implicitly advocates the disclosure of the complete file directly to the defendant. Cases such as Nixon and Ritchie, however, can be distinguished from Rovario. Unlike Rovario, the administration ofjustice in these two cases could still be adequately achieved without disclosure of confidential information that had no bearing on the outcome of the proceedings. In Rovario, the right to a fair trial depended on the disclosure of the complete body of confidential information which was the witness' name. Rovario, 343 U.S. at 56-58. 220 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 714-16. The Court in Ritchie rejected the need for defense counsel's participation in the in camera review but noted that the defendant could make specific requests for known information and argue its materiality. Furthermore, the majority stressed that the trial court's duty to review was ongoing so that information originally thought to be immaterial might eventually be properly disclosed. Ritchie 165, 182 (1969) ("[a] n apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event... may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate facts" and "may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances"); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957)(defendant is entitled to inspect reports submitted by government witnesses " [b] ecause only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for the purpose of discrediting the Government's witness"). 224 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
increased burden on trial judges, who will now have to evaluate every piece of information in the file. 2 32 By limiting the search to prior inconsistent statements, the concern that the files need be reviewed with the "eyes of an advocate" could have been reduced.
33
Furthermore, allegations that the trial court would be unable to perform an ongoing review would be minimized because the trial court would only need to focus on comparing the trial transcript to verbatim statements contained in the CYS files. 23 4 In short, had the majority limited the in camera review to an inspection of the witness' out-of-court statements, Ritchie might have better avoided any concerns that trial courts cannot adequately protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
IX. CONCLUSION
In Ritchie, the plurality's narrow view of the scope of the confrontation clause would in many instances render it an "empty formality." 23 5 The defendant's ability under the confrontation clause to cross-examine witnesses against him cannot be inhibited if society is to remain steadfast in its "belief that the right of confrontation any released material. Id. at 568, 472 A.2d at 226. This step would tend to undermine any benefit achieved from conducting the in camera review in the first place. 232 The Court's expansion to a full review for exculpatory evidence was unnecessary in this case. Ritchie's counsel basically asked for access to specific medical records and the names of any potential witnesses that might be contained in the file. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994-95. Ritchie's request could easily have been satisfied by an in camera review for these specific items in addition to the generalized search for inconsistent statements. See id., 107 S. Ct. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("When reviewing confidential records in future cases, trial courts should be particularly aware of the possibility that impeachment evidence of a key prosecution witness could well constitute the sort whose unavailability to the defendant would undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial."). 233 Justice Brennan stated in his dissent that " [t] he prospect that these statements will not be regarded as material is enhanced by the fact that due process analysis requires that information be evaluated by the trialjudge, not defense counsel." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although it will always be possible that a trial judge might fail to recognize a subtle inconsistency, the Court dismissed this risk in holding that the state's compelling interest in confidentiality outweighed the defendant's absolute right to disclosure. Id. at 1003. Justice Powell explained that the trial court would not have unlimited discretion because "[i]f a defendant is aware of specific information contained in the file (e.g., the medical report), he is free to request it directly from the court." Id.
234 Compare Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969) (in camera review of surveillance records from illegal wiretap rejected in situation in which "the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the ... judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government's case") with Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317-18 (1969)(per curiam)(in camera review of illegal wiretaps was proper in situation in which the task was not overly complex).
235 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 2 36 It is important that courts recognize that a defendant's ability to cross-examine a witness can be affected equally by events occurring both in and out of the courtroom. Limiting the application of the confrontation clause to infringements occurring only at trial makes little sense if the end result denies a defendant the opportunity to effectively impeach a witness' testimony during crossexamination. Therefore, to retain the clause's vitality, courts should examine whether a defendant's opportunity for cross-examination is a potentially useful opportunity to expose weaknesses in a witness' testimony. The plurality in Ritchie, however, divorced the confrontation clause analysis from these practical considerations. Thus, the Court essentially laid the groundwork for an unequal and inconsistent application of the confrontation clause to future defendants. Fortunately, in Ritchie, the Court arrived at a solution that will assure the defendant an opportunity for a fairjudgment. An in camera review of the confidential files by the trial court will adequately protect the interests of both the state and the defendant. Although trial judges are perfectly capable of conducting such reviews, the burden of conducting a broad search for any relevant material, rather than a search only for inconsistent out-of-court statements, could become substantial. Given the commonwealth's strong interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such sensitive files, however, the burden of an in camera review is the best way to secure the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
